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Background: Traditional processes for the production of pandemic influenza vaccines are not capable of producing a
vaccine that could be deployed sooner than 5–6 months after strain identification. Plant-based vaccine technologies are
of public health interest because they represent an opportunity to begin vaccinating earlier.
Methods: We used an age- and risk- structured disease transmission model for Canada to evaluate the potential impact
of a plant-produced vaccine available for rapid deployment (within 1–3 months) compared to an egg-based
vaccine timeline.
Results: We found that in the case of a mildly transmissible virus (R0 = 1.3), depending on the amount of plant-based
vaccine produced per week, severe clinical outcomes could be decreased by 60–100 % if vaccine was available within
3 months of strain identification. However, in the case of a highly transmissible virus (R0 = 2.0), a delay of 3 months does
not change clinical outcomes regardless of the level of weekly vaccine availability. If transmissibility is high, the
only strategy that can impact clinical outcomes occurs if vaccine production is high and available within 2 months.
Conclusions: Pandemic influenza vaccines produced by plants, change the timeline of pandemic vaccine availability in a
way that could significantly mitigate the impact of the next influenza pandemic.
Keywords: Influenza, Vaccination, Pandemic, Plant-based vaccines, Disease dynamicsBackground
The 2009 (H1N1) influenza pandemic represented a unique
public health challenge for the world. In most people, the
H1N1 pandemic strain caused relatively mild, self-limiting
disease while others experienced severe disease requiring
hospital and/or ICU admission, prolonged ventilation and
supportive care, and some individuals died as a result of
their infection [1-3]. Governments, healthcare providers
and facilities, along with industry had been preparing best
practices and strategies for mitigating the potential impact
of a pandemic for many years prior to the emergence of the
pandemic H1N1 virus in Mexico and subsequent global
spread [4-6]. Globally, countries have developed pandemic
plans that include descriptions of available mitigation strat-
egies and plans for deploying available public health re-
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unless otherwise stated.along with community interventions such as school clo-
sures and other types of social distancing [7]. Vaccination
has always formed the cornerstone of public health inter-
ventions and pandemic influenza is no different. In this
case, the development of a pandemic influenza vaccine be-
gins when the viral strain has been fully sequenced and the
strain information released to vaccine manufacturers. Once
a suitable vaccine candidate has been developed, regulatory
processes are in place to verify that the vaccine candidate is
both safe and effective. Once the vaccine has been ap-
proved for use, public vaccination campaigns can begin
using a vaccine prioritization strategy based on the epi-
demiology of the disease in the population.
Most vaccine manufacturers who develop influenza vac-
cines use 9–12 day old embryonated eggs to produce the
vaccine. The vaccine strain is injected into the eggs where
it replicates over several days while the eggs are incubated.
After incubation, the egg contains many millions of vaccine
virus particles that are purified to produce the antigen thatan Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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limiting step in this process is the number of eggs that each
manufacturer can procure, inoculate and incubate at a time.
Another issue is that some strains of influenza virus do not
replicate well in eggs and as a result, it is difficult to pro-
duce enough antigen to manufacture large amounts of vac-
cine for distribution. As demonstrated in 2009, the full
process of vaccine production, safety testing, clinical trials
and regulatory approval optimistically takes between 5-6
months (and could be longer for strains that grow more
poorly in eggs). Recent advances in virology and immun-
ology have resulted in many novel techniques that could
revolutionize the way we produce vaccines. One such strat-
egy focuses on the expression of recombinant protein in
the cells of tobacco plants [8, 9]. This plant-based produc-
tion system produces yields consistent with an industrial
process and these yields are achieved in a relatively short
period of time (suggested to be within 3 weeks of the
release of the pandemic strain) [10, 11]. Wirz et al. [12] de-
scribe a plant-based vaccine production system that is able
to produce virus-like particles within weeks of production
start-up using an automated production system. More re-
cently, in response to the circulation of a highly virulent
strain of influenza virus (H7N9) in China which was first
reported in March 2013, Medicago Inc. (a clinical stage,
biopharmaceutical company) was able to produce the first
lot of plant-produced vaccine for pre-clinical trials only 19
days after the sequence was first accessed [13]. Importantly,
data emerging from phase 1 clinical trials of plant-
produced influenza vaccines appear to suggest that these
vaccines are highly immunogenic and safe [10, 14, 15]. Due
to the expected shortened time frame for vaccine produc-
tion, plant-made, virus-like particle influenza vaccines rep-
resent an important opportunity for protecting public
health in the case of the next influenza pandemic.
For this study, we have evaluated the proposed vaccine
timing and expected range of plant-based vaccine pro-
duction capabilities on pandemic influenza outcomes
using a mathematical model. Specifically, we used a dy-
namic, age- and risk- stratified SEIR model for the trans-
mission of pandemic influenza within the Canadian
population. This approach allows us to examine the
interactions that exist between the time at which a pan-
demic influenza vaccine is available to the public, and
the transmission characteristics of the pandemic strain.
We will examine how these interactions affect the pro-
jected clinical outcomes observed in the simulations
such as changes in the clinical attack rate, hospitaliza-
tions, and deaths using a mathematical model.
Methods
Dynamic model
The model was developed using the dynamic simulation
tool, AnyLogic © (V.7.0) (St. Petersburg, Russia). The basemodel is a system dynamic, Susceptible (S) – Exposed (E) –
Infected (I) – Recovered (R) model similar to a previously
published model describing the transmission of pandemic
influenza within Canada [16]. The infectious (I) compart-
ment is broken down into two different components. The
first represents individuals who are infectious but asymp-
tomatic (IA) and the second represents individuals who are
infectious and symptomatic (IS). We assumed that 40 % of
all cases were asymptomatic [17] and that all infected indi-
viduals were equally infectious. In addition, two outcome
compartments are included. These are Hospitalized (H)
and Death (D). This permits us to keep track of two specific
clinical outcomes of interest. Symptomatically infectious in-
dividuals (Is) are able to recover from their infection or al-
ternatively, may require hospitalization, in which case they
transition to the (H) compartment. From the Hospitalized
(H) compartment, individuals may move to the recovered
compartment (R) or may die as a result of their infection
and move to the Death compartment (D). We assume that
deaths only occur in patients who have severe enough dis-
ease to require hospitalization. The model runs for a time
period of 12 months and therefore we did not consider the
immigration or emigration of individuals, nor did we con-
sider population aging.
Model structure (age and risk groups)
The model population is broken down into seven different
age classes with the following cut-offs: 0–4 years, 5–13
years, 14–17 years, 18–22 years, 23–52 years, 53–64 years
and ≥65 years. Data on the population demographics was
obtained from Statistics Canada [18]. During the 2009 pan-
demic, older individuals appeared to have some level of
pre-existing immunity due to exposure to an antigenically
similar virus earlier in their life [19]. Since it is not possible
to know if this may be the case in a future pandemic we
chose to only examine scenarios where the level of pre-
existing immunity was 0 % (Table 1) in order to consider a
“worst-case” scenario. Mixing between the different age
groups was parameterized based on data collected by
Mossong et al. [20]. Each of the age classes is further sub-
divided into two health states. Individuals are classified as
either healthy or as having one or more underlying
chronic medical conditions for which seasonal influ-
enza vaccine is recommended. The chronic conditions
considered in the model were based on data from the
Canadian Community Health Survey [21]. State transi-
tions were the same for healthy individuals and individuals
with chronic conditions however, individuals with chronic
conditions had an enhanced risk of having a poor clinical
outcome (e.g. hospitalization or death as a result of their
infection). During the 2009 pandemic pregnant women
were also considered to be at high risk for complications
from pandemic influenza [3]. As a result, we have included
a separate pregnancy state that represents women in the
Table 1 Vaccination scenarios to be examined using the dynamic model
Scenarios 1 and 2 Scenarios 3 and 4 Scenarios 5 and 6
Pandemic transmissibility* Mild/Severe Mild/Severe Mild/Severe
Season of emergence Spring/Fall Spring/Fall Spring/Fall
Level of pre-existing immunity in level
of pre-existing immunity in population
0% 0% 0%
Time at which first vaccine becomes available (range) 6 months 1 month (1–3 months) 1 month (1–3 months)
Time at which additional vaccine becomes available _ _ 6 months
Doses of traditional (egg-based) vaccine required 1/2 _ 1/2
Doses of novel (plant-based) vaccine required _ 1/2 1/2
Vaccine coverage* UIIP UIIP UIIP
Vaccine production for traditional vaccine 3.75 M doses/week 3.75 M doses/week




Outcomes** CPIP moderate CPIP moderate CPIP moderate
*See Table 2 for details regarding specific parameter values for pandemic influenza transmissibility scenarios and vaccine coverage.
**See Table 2 for details.
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number of pregnant women at any point in time were cal-
culated using data from Statistics Canada on pregnancies
and live births [22].
Seasonal effects
Influenza demonstrates marked seasonality with disease
occurrence primarily in winter months [23, 24]. This
seasonality influences the expected wave pattern of pan-
demic influenza. To model the seasonal dynamics of a
potential influenza pandemic we include reduced trans-
mission over the course of the summer, when typical in-
fluenza seasonality and changes in contact patterns may
reduce the basic reproductive number (R0). The base
model for a spring emergence starts with the Canadian
pandemic strain introduced to Canada in April (similar
to the 2009 pandemic). This generates the characteris-
tic, 2-wave pattern seen in past pandemics (a small,
herald wave in the spring followed by a larger fall
wave). For comparison, the model is adjusted to look at
the impact of a pandemic influenza strain introduction
that occurs in the fall (resulting in a single large wave
of influenza cases).
Vaccination strategies
Vaccination in the model assumes a risk/outcome based
vaccination strategy similar to the vaccine prioritization
observed in Canada during the 2009 pandemic. Vaccine
prioritization in the model is therefore as follows: 1)
pregnant women and all individuals with a chronic
underlying condition as defined by the CCHS (regardless
of age), 2) healthy children aged 0–4 and healthy adults
aged 65+, 3) healthy children aged 5-17, and 4) healthy
adults aged 18–64.We assume that pandemic vaccine uptake would be
similar to seasonal influenza vaccine uptake in Ontario,
where influenza vaccine is available free of charge
through the universal influenza immunization program
(UIIP) to any individual wishing to receive the vaccine
who is 6 months of age or older (Table 1) [25, 26]. We
have considered two different dosing schedules with in-
dividuals receiving one dose or two doses of pandemic
influenza vaccine. In the case of a severe pandemic
(virus is easily transmissible and/or clinically severe), we
assume that individuals would require two doses
whereas if the pandemic strain were less severe (only
mildly transmissible and/or causing mild to moderate
clinical symptoms) we assume that individuals could be
vaccinated with only one dose. For scenarios using a
one-dose schedule, we assume that full immunity occurs
10 days after vaccination. In comparison, for scenarios
using a two-dose schedule, we assume that full immun-
ity occurs immediately after vaccination with the second
dose. We do not consider the effect of partial protection
following the first dose in the two-dose schedule.
The fraction of the population that acquires immunity is
based on vaccine effectiveness (VE) estimates for two differ-
ent age groups (those older than 65 years and those less
than 65 years). We assume that the effectiveness of the pan-
demic vaccine is similar to that of seasonal influenza vac-
cine with lower effectiveness in older individuals (Table 1).
Novel, clinical-stage vaccine candidates produced
using plants may be available for use in the case of the
next influenza pandemic. We expect that there will be
different types of pandemic vaccine available on the
Canadian market including both traditionally produced
influenza vaccine (egg-based), and novel, plant-produced
vaccines. It is expected that the time from the availability
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demic vaccine is available in the community is signifi-
cantly shorter for a vaccine that is produced using a
plant-based technology rather than an egg-based tech-
nology. Egg-based vaccine technology takes approxi-
mately 6 months from strain identification to having
vaccine vials available for public use [16] whereas, we
assume that a plant-based vaccine could likely be pro-
duced in 1–3 months. Based on publically available data
for traditional, egg-based pandemic vaccine production
by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) in Canada, we assume that
3.75 million doses of pandemic vaccine would be avail-
able per week once the vaccine was approved for use
(Health Canada, 2013). For comparison, we have evalu-
ated both a low production scenario and a high produc-
tion scenario for a plant-produced vaccine. In the base
case, we assume that a plant-produced vaccine enters
the Canadian market at 150,000 doses/week and that the
upper bound for production capability is 1.5 million
doses/week. For all vaccine scenarios, we do not con-
sider the logistical time lags associated with distributing
vaccine across Canada.
Results
A total of 225 simulations were run using the dynamic
model representing different combinations of vaccin-
ation strategies (vaccine coverage, type of vaccine, tim-
ing of vaccine availability, and vaccine production levels)
and different pandemic scenarios (season of emergence,
and transmissibility) (Table 1). The model outputs in-
cluded epidemic curves for each scenario and the clin-
ical attack rate for the first 12 months of the simulated
pandemic. Using the model outputs we also projected
the number of possible hospitalizations and deaths for
each scenario based on assumptions published in the
Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan (CPIP) regarding the
potential impact of a pandemic of moderate clinical
severity [7].
In general, simulation results for scenarios in the ab-
sence of any pandemic interventions were in line with pre-
viously published work describing influenza transmission
in a mild pandemic (e.g. 2009) and a severe pandemic (e.g.
1918) [27-32]. Simulations with an R0 of 1.3 resulted in
lower clinical attack rates (<30 %) than those observed in
simulated pandemics with an R0 of 2.0 (<50 %) (Fig. 1). In
addition, scenarios where the pandemic strain emerges in
Canada in the spring (Fig. 1B) exhibit lower overall clinical
attack rates than scenarios where the pandemic emerges
in the fall (Fig. 1A).
The impact of traditional pandemic vaccine
For scenarios where the only vaccination option is trad-
itional pandemic influenza vaccine with availability starting
6 months after the emergence of the pandemic strain and3.75 million doses available each week, the ability of vaccin-
ation to reduce adverse clinical outcomes (clinical attack
rate, hospitalizations and/or deaths) is poor if the pandemic
is highly transmissible (R0 = 2.0) regardless of the season of
emergence (Fig. 2). In this case, such a significant propor-
tion of the population has already been infected by the time
vaccine becomes available that the percent reduction in
clinical outcomes compared to the baseline scenario (with
no interventions) is essentially zero.
For a mild pandemic (R0 = 1.3), vaccination beginning
at 6 months is able to reduce clinical outcomes such as
hospitalization and deaths primarily by prioritizing the
vaccination of high-risk individuals. This can be seen in
Fig. 2, where reductions in projected hospitalizations
and deaths range from approximately 20–80 % depend-
ing on the season of pandemic emergence. However, it is
important to point out that since vaccine only becomes
available at 6 months and vaccination is prioritized to
high-risk individuals, vaccination beginning at the 6
month time point is not sufficient to reduce the overall
clinical attack rate (Fig. 2).
The potential impact of a novel plant-based pandemic
vaccine
In a situation where a safe and effective pandemic vac-
cine could be produced and become available earlier in a
pandemic than traditional pandemic vaccine a significant
impact can be seen in the ability of a vaccination pro-
gram to reduce serious adverse clinical outcomes. This
is the case for both a mild pandemic and more severe
pandemic (Figs. 3 and 4). More moderate reductions can
be seen in the reduction of overall clinical attack rates
(Figs. 3 and 4).
In the case of a mild pandemic (R0 = 1.3) where plant-
based vaccine production is 150,000 doses/week, if vaccine
deployment begins between 1 month and 3 months post
emergence (3–5 months earlier than current traditional
pandemic vaccine availability), hospitalizations and deaths
could be reduced 60–100 % compared to the base case over
the course of a year long pandemic regardless of season of
emergence (Fig. 3). If plant-based vaccine production were
higher (1.5 million doses/week), hospitalizations and deaths
could be almost entirely avoided if vaccine became available
within 3 months of emergence in Canada. Transmission
would still occur within the population as seen by a rela-
tively steady clinical attack rate (Fig. 3), however, because
vaccine would be available to vaccinate the most high risk
individuals early in the pandemic, serious morbidity and
mortality could be avoided.
If the transmissibility of the pandemic strain was rela-
tively high (R0 = 2.0), earlier vaccine availability is of key
importance for reducing population morbidity and mortal-
ity. In this case, a delay of 3 months will have only a very
minimal impact on clinical outcomes (Fig. 4) regardless of
Fig. 1 The model projected clinical attack rates (%) for all combinations of simulation runs for a simulated Canadian pandemic that emerges in
fall (top - A) or spring (bottom - B) for two different transmissibility values (1.3 and 2.0)
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ever, if vaccine production levels are high (1.5 million
doses/week) and vaccine became available between 1 and 2
months post emergence, a vaccination program could re-
duce clinical outcomes significantly (Fig. 4). In this case, the
differences observed between a fall emergence (Fig. 4A)
and a spring emergence (Fig. 4B) are minimal.
The impact of plant-based vaccines combined with trad-
itional vaccines
For almost all scenarios, the impact of the 2 different vac-
cines together is similar to scenarios 3 & 4 (Table 1) where
only plant-based vaccine is available. This is because, if
plant-based vaccine is available early (within 1–2 monthsof viral emergence) and production levels are high, the
vaccine coverage levels examined here (Table 2) are met
before traditional vaccine becomes available at 6 months.
For scenarios where plant-based vaccine becomes available
at 3 months or the plant-based vaccine production levels
are low, there are several weeks of overlap between the
availability of the two different vaccines (plant-based and
traditional) in order to achieve the population vaccine
coverage levels examined in the model.
In these simulations, projected hospitalizations and
deaths could be reduced more than 80 % even if the pro-
duction of plant-based vaccines is at low levels (150,000
doses/week), if vaccine is available early and the pandemic
is relatively mild (Fig. 5). If, plant-based vaccine production
Fig. 2 The percent reduction in clinical outcomes for a scenario where traditional pandemic influenza vaccine begins to be deployed 6 months
after the emergence of the pandemic strain in Canada relative to a scenario with no vaccine available (base case = no interventions). Results are
broken down by season of emergence (A = fall, B = spring)
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early, adverse outcomes could almost entirely be avoided if
the pandemic was mild (Fig. 5). Incorporating both plant-
based vaccine (with low production levels per week) and
traditional vaccine (at 6 months) has a more significant
impact on reducing hospitalizations and deaths than plant-
based vaccine alone if the production of plant-based vac-
cines is at low levels (Figs. 3 and 5). In the case of a severe
pandemic (R0 = 2.0), the impact of adding traditional vac-
cine at 6 months time does not change the overall impact
of vaccination on hospitalizations, deaths, or clinical attack
rates from scenarios where only plant-based vaccine is
available (Figs. 4 and 6).Discussion
Decreasing the time between pandemic influenza virus
emergence and the time at which a safe and effective
vaccine is available for distribution can have a signifi-
cant impact on public health [16, 33-35]. The 2009
(H1N1) influenza pandemic highlighted the fact that
producing large amounts of vaccine in a short amount
of time using existing egg-based technologies is diffi-
cult. This model demonstrates that early vaccine avail-
ability could significantly decrease pandemic influenza
morbidity and mortality by more than 50 % in the case
of a mild pandemic with low, plant-based vaccine pro-
duction capabilities (150,000 doses/week) and up to
Fig. 3 The percent reduction in clinical outcomes for a scenario where a plant-produced pandemic influenza vaccine could be deployed 1, 2 or 3
months after the emergence of the pandemic strain (R0 = 1.3) in Canada relative to a scenario with no vaccine available. Results are broken down
by season of emergence (A = fall, B = spring)
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(~1.5 million doses/week). In the case of a severe pan-
demic, reductions in pandemic influenza morbidity and
mortality between 15 and 60 % may be possible with
low, plant-based vaccine production capabilities and up
to 90 % if production capabilities were high. If the pan-
demic strain was highly transmissible (R0 = 2.0), and no
other intervention strategies were available, early vac-
cine availability is the only way to reduce clinical out-
comes such as hospitalization and death. Late vaccine
availability in a scenario where the pandemic strain is
highly transmissible is not able to reduce pandemic as-
sociated hospitalizations or deaths.Shortening the time between viral emergence and the
start of a national vaccine program has a more signifi-
cant impact on averting population morbidity and mor-
tality than on population clinical attack rates. We based
our simulated vaccine programs on a prioritization plan
similar to that seen in Canada during the 2009 pandemic
[16]. The vaccine program would prioritize individuals
with underlying chronic health conditions followed by
individuals at increased risk of suffering an adverse influ-
enza associated outcome followed by all other healthy
individuals [16]. Alternative prioritization strategies have
not been evaluated in the current simulations but may
be worth considering especially given the added benefit
Fig. 4 The percent reduction in clinical outcomes for a scenario where plant-produced pandemic influenza vaccine begins to be deployed 1, 2 or
3 months after the emergence of the pandemic strain (R0= 2.0) in Canada relative to a scenario with no vaccine available. Results are broken down by
season of emergence (A = fall, B = spring)
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produced and distributed rapidly and in large quantities
early in a pandemic.
Previous modeling work has demonstrated that if a
pandemic vaccine were available early in a pandemic,
prioritizing influenza “transmitters” such as young, healthy
children rather than individuals at highest risk of
suffering a severe outcome such as hospitalization or
death could provide more benefit than the typical influ-
enza prioritization plan which focuses on individuals at
highest risk of suffering an adverse outcome [36]. These
alternative vaccine prioritization strategies should be
further evaluated in the context of both the timing andproduction capabilities of emerging plant-based vaccine
production technologies.
We have used conservative estimates of vaccine effective-
ness in our simulations. We have set vaccine effectiveness
values to be the same for traditional vaccine and the plant-
based vaccine in order to focus our results on the projected
impact of differential vaccine timing. However, if the vac-
cine effectiveness estimates for the plant-based vaccine
were higher than those examined here, especially for older
individuals for whom traditional influenza vaccines are only
weakly immunogenic [37], the reduction in clinical out-
comes compared to the base case could be even greater
than what we have described. Preliminary clinical data
Table 2 Model parameter values
Variable Age group(s) Value Source
Total population size All 33,739,859 [47]
Proportion of the population with pre-existing immunity 53 years + 0% [48]
Mild pandemic scenario
Latent period (days) All 3.5 days [16, 27]
Duration of Infectiousness (days) All 2.5 days
Reproductive Number All 1.3
Severe Pandemic Scenario
Latent period (days) All 1.9 days [28, 49]
Duration of infectiousness (days) All 4.1 days [28, 49]
Reproductive number All 2.0 [28]
Vaccine scenarios
Vaccine effectiveness (traditional influenza vaccine) <65 years 0.7 [50]
≥65 years 0.3
Vaccine effectiveness (plant-based pandemic influenza vaccine) <65 years 0.7 Assumption
≥65 years 0.3














Percentage of clinically ill individuals who are hospitalized and recover All 1% [7]
Hospitalized cases that die All 0.4% [7]
Greer BMC Research Notes  (2015) 8:191 Page 9 of 13suggest that influenza vaccines containing plant-made,
virus-like particles may demonstrate improved vaccine ef-
fectiveness [10, 38, 39]. As more research regarding the
outcomes of human clinical trials of plant-made vaccines
containing virus-like particles (VLP) becomes available,
realistic vaccine effectiveness estimates for these novel vac-
cines can be incorporated into the existing mathematical
models for pandemic influenza. We would expect that if
these novel vaccines were able to elicit an improved im-
mune response, especially in individuals older than 65 years
of age, the results of this modeling exercise could be con-
sidered conservative estimates.
We have also used conservative estimates for the
upper bound of plant-based vaccine availability. In oursimulations, we assumed that the maximum production
capability would be 1.5 million doses available per week
for a plant-based vaccine. Our results demonstrate that
at this level of production, significant protection can be
provided to the population especially when vaccine is
available early. Recently, an industrial virus-like particle,
plant-based vaccine production facility built in Research
Park Triangle, NC has demonstrated that it was capable
of producing 10 million doses of an influenza vaccine
candidate in 1 month (2.5 million doses per week). The
US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) funded this production challenge test as an
initiative to encourage industry to develop scalable pro-
cesses that would enable the rapid production of
Fig. 5 The percent reduction in clinical outcomes for a scenario where plant-based pandemic influenza vaccine begins to be deployed 1, 2 or 3
months after the emergence of the pandemic strain (R0= 1.3) in Canada combined with the availability of traditional pandemic vaccine beginning at 6
months relative to a scenario with no vaccine available. Results are broken down by season of emergence (A = fall, B = spring), and expected
vaccine production levels (for plant-based vaccines)
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threats [40].
As with all mathematical models, this model includes
simplifying assumptions and incorporates parameter
values that are subject to some uncertainty. The model
presented examines a range of pre-defined scenarios and
does not have the ability to identify the likelihood that a
given scenario will or will not occur. All of the scenarios
examined here base the vaccine timing on the virus
emerging in Canada. It is likely that if the pandemic
strain were to emerge outside of Canada (e.g. southeast
Asia) vaccine development would begin before the virus
was imported to Canada. If this were the case, it maypermit earlier vaccine availability even using traditional,
egg-based vaccines. However, research has demonstrated
that given the highly connected nature of the global
population, regardless of where the pandemic originates,
global spread is likely to occur rapidly [41-43]. This
highlights the need for a pandemic vaccine production
system that is flexible and can respond quickly in the
case of a pandemic such that public health vaccination
programs could begin earlier than the typical 5–6
months after the emergence of the pandemic strain.
We have examined two different scenarios related to
the emergence of a pandemic influenza virus in Canada
(spring and fall). The timing of the peak of the pandemic
Fig. 6 The percent reduction in clinical outcomes for a scenario where plant-produced pandemic influenza vaccine is deployed 1, 2 or 3 months
after the emergence of the pandemic strain (R0= 2.0) in Canada combined with the availability of traditional pandemic vaccine at 6 months relative to a
scenario with no vaccine available. Results are broken down by season of emergence (A = fall, B = spring), and expected vaccine production
levels (for plant-based vaccines)
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cine campaign is a critical factor. We have examined
these two scenarios as examples to illustrate the poten-
tial impact of vaccine timing however, changes to peak
timing will impact the outcome of a vaccination pro-
gram either positively or negatively.
Our vaccination simulations did not specifically ad-
dress the possibility of providing vaccination for individ-
uals working in critical infrastructure such as healthcare
or others who would need to remain on the job during a
pandemic. We assume that all individuals in the popula-
tion would be vaccinated based on the described
prioritization list and coverage levels (Table 1). We feelthat this is a reasonable approximation of population
vaccine coverage. Even if vaccination were recom-
mended for specific sectors, individuals who would typ-
ically not accept seasonal influenza vaccine are unlikely
to accept a pandemic vaccine unless the pandemic were
especially severe. We also know that mandating influ-
enza vaccine for specific sectors such as healthcare
workers has met with significant resistance from em-
ployees and employee unions but in some circumstances
may be a useful strategies to consider [44-46]. Our
model does not specifically address other outcomes as-
sociated with vaccine programs such as societal disrup-
tion and/or economic costs. It is also important to
Greer BMC Research Notes  (2015) 8:191 Page 12 of 13recognize that even though we have assumed that a
plant-produced vaccine could be available between 1
and 3 months after the pandemic virus emerges; we have
not considered the potential regulatory delays associated
with vaccine approval, which would impact the actual
release of the vaccine to the public.
We did not consider the effect of spatial heterogeneity or
the time required to distribute vaccine across the country,
which could result in delays in vaccine program start times
not considered by this model. We also did not incorporate
other concurrent mitigation strategies on influenza trans-
mission, including antivirals and social distancing measures.
We did not consider the impact of co-circulating seasonal
influenza strains. To address the uncertainty in our esti-
mates of mortality and hospitalization rates, due to both
the low frequency of occurrence of these outcomes and
reporting biases and other limitations inherent in surveil-
lance data, we have focused our analysis on qualitative
results.
Conclusions
Using a mathematical model that simulates the transmis-
sion of pandemic influenza virus within Canada, we have
demonstrated that vaccine timing is of critical importance.
Given the highly connected nature of the global population,
it is unlikely that countries will have significant lead-time
for the development and distribution of a pandemic vaccine
before clinical cases are identified. Regardless of where the
next pandemic virus emerges, the ability to rapidly develop
and provide access to a safe and effective pandemic influ-
enza vaccine is of importance for the control of pandemic
influenza. Vaccine remains the primary mechanism to pre-
vent serious clinical outcomes in the most vulnerable
groups. Our results demonstrate that early public access to
pandemic influenza vaccine within the first several months
of an influenza pandemic, as opposed to the traditional
timeline currently assumed using traditional egg-based in-
fluenza vaccine production platforms has the ability to pre-
vent a significant number of severe clinical outcomes such
as hospitalization and death. Pandemic vaccine production
platforms that utilize plant-based technologies represent an
important opportunity for meeting the need for pandemic
influenza vaccine within a timeframe that could provide sig-
nificant benefit and protection for susceptible individuals
and populations.
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